Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion by Faure-Grimaud, Antoine et al.


1 Int rod uct ion
The object ive of this paper is to study supervisory st ructures in organizat ions and the
fundamental t rade-oÆs involved in the design of those st ructures. We envision supervision
as the task of collect ing signals about otherwise hidden informat ion on the employees'
act ivit ies. Cent ral to our analysis is the necessity to deter collusion between supervisors
and supervisees and the need to provide incent ives to these coalit ions to behave in a
way which maximizes Ørms' proØts instead of their own object ives. There are two main
mot ivat ions for this paper.
The Ørst stems from the importance of supervisory act ivit ies in organizat ions. For
instance, Chandler (1962) has forcefully argued that changes in supervisory st ructures
const itute the bulk of organizat ional innovat ions over the last century. Organizat ions
devote large resources to supervision and do so, having in mind the threat of collusion
between supervisors and supervisees. Given the importance of this issue for organizat ional
design, it is crucial to ident ify the set of parameters likely to aÆect the e± ciency of
supervision. Answering this quest ion requires an understanding of how the economic
environment of the Ørm aÆects the e± ciency of collusion inside the Ørm.
Our second mot ivat ion is to Øll a gap in the collusion literature between two of its
most quoted papers, namely Tirole (1986) and Tirole (1992). These papers oÆer a stylized
model of a Ørm where the owner (thereafter the principal) has to hire a supervisor to collect
informat ion about a product ive agent . The supervisor can conceal what he learns and can
engage in a collusive side-cont ract with the agent when doing so favors his own interests.
In Tirole (1986), it is assumed that exchanging bribes through this side-cont ract does not
entail any dead-weight loss and only two extreme cases where the supervisor is risk neut ral
and inØnitely risk averse are considered. The result s are dramat ically diÆerent in those two
polar cases. Under risk neutrality, collusion is not a problem for the organizat ion. Under
inØnite risk aversion, supervisory informat ion is useless and collusion is most harmful to
the organizat ion.
Alternat ively, the methodology followed by Tirole (1992) is to assume that the su-
pervisor and the agent are both risk-neut ral although protected by limited liability (an
assumpt ion which can be restated as saying that they are inØnitely risk averse for negat ive
wealth levels). Some exogenous transact ion costs of t ransferring bribes are introduced to
model collusion ine± ciencies. The magnitude of these costs appears to crucially aÆect
the performance of the organizat ion. These t ransact ion costs can be thought of as a
short-cut for capturing unmodeled frict ions in collusion like, for instance, the di± culty
of t ransferring money between the colluding part ies in the absence of any enforcement
technology. Although this approach has proved to be ext remely useful in studying how
collusion threats aÆect economic outcomes, it s major limitat ion lies precisely in its in-
ability to relate the e± ciency of collusion to the various parameters characterizing the
environment where the Ørm evolves. Comparat ive stat ics exercises in this framework
are only valid in so far as the modeler expects the e± ciency of collusion not to change
with exogenous perturbat ions of the model. The present paper oÆers one possible way of
solving this di± culty.
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As suggested by Tirole (1986), we start from the idea that the e± ciency of collusion can
be linked to the risk aversion of the supervisor. Surely, risk aversion of Ørm's employees is
a reasonable empirical assumpt ion, but beyond the two polar cases emphasized by Tirole,
lit t le is known of it s role in collusion and on the design of collusion-proof organizat ions.
By allowing for some Ønite degree of risk aversion, we will characterize how the frict ions
of collusion are aÆected by the economic environment .
Our analysis shows that the cost for the principal of Øghting collusion increases cont in-
uously with the supervisor's degree of risk aversion. The principal always prefers to avoid
collusion between the supervisor and the agent . However, inducing informat ion revelat ion
by the supervisor requires giving him a reward when he reports an informative signal on
the agent and a punishment otherwise. To prevent collusion, the risk averse supervisor
is now subject to some risk and inducing him to part icipate in the grand-cont ract with
the principal before he learns anything about the agent becomes cost ly. It can only be
obtained by giving him a risk premium.1 Consequent ly, the principal is worse oÆwith a
more risk averse supervisor as this trade-oÆbetween inducing informat ion revelat ion and
part icipat ion is more acute.
More generally, the t rade-oÆbetween insurance and incentives will be more or less
cost ly in terms of e± ciency depending on various parameters characterizing the environ-
ment where collusion takes place. One dimension of the environment is the quality of
informat ion sources available to the supervisor. Focusing Ørst on the cost of preventing
collusion, we show that this cost is hump-shaped in the precision of informat ion. Increas-
ing the supervisor' s informat ion accuracy may subject the supervisor to addit ional risk
and may increase this cost . However, we show that the beneØt of increasing control on
the agent always outweights this Ørst eÆect . Therefore an increase in the precision of
supervisory informat ion always increases the principal's welfare.
Second, we also invest igate how to design the port folio of monitoring tasks assigned
to a supervisor. An important quest ion is to Ønd out whether it is bet ter to pool diÆerent
monitoring act ivit ies under the control of the same supervisor rather than having several
supervisors, one for each act ivity. With constant risk aversion, incent ives to prevent
collusion on one task are designed independently of the incent ives on other tasks. In
such a context , we derive an irrelevance result which can be used as a benchmark: if the
supervisor has constant absolute risk aversion, the principal's proØt does not depend on
the number of tasks allocated to the supervisor.
Third, we discuss the interact ion between the external compet it ive pressure to which
a Ørm in the market place may be subject to and its internal collusion problem. In a
simple model with linear demand, we show that the Ørm's equilibrium output is less
sensit ive to compet it ive pressure as the supervisor is more risk averse. Indeed, as the risk
premium needed to induce the lat ter' s part icipat ion increases, expanding output becomes
more di± cult as if there were more competitors in the market . Everything happens as
if the internal collusion problem exacerbates the compet it ive pressure and forces each
compet ing Ørm to reduce it s output plan more severely.
1There is here an analogy with the st andard moral hazard problem. Collusion can be viewed as a form
of \ hidden gaming", and deterring it is akin to inducing the right choice of act ion from the principal's
point of view.
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Fourth, we brie∞y discuss how vert ical integrat ion aÆects the incent ives to collude.
Vert ical integrat ion improves monitoring but it also facilitates collusion. Vert ical inte-
grat ion can only be proØtable to organizat ions having supervisors with a su± cient ly low
degree of risk aversion.
Finally, we study the impact of uncertainty in the Ørm's environment on collusion
within the Ørm. We show that the t iming of communicat ion, i.e., whether the supervisor
reports before or after the realizat ion of some uncertainty, can be used by the principal to
reduce the risk-premium he pays to ensure the supervisor's part icipat ion. By asking for
reports before uncertainty is realized, the optimal cont ract is made less sensit ive to the
outside environment. Instead, the t iming of communicat ion would be irrelevant if there
were no collusion or if the collusion technology was Øxed as in Tirole (1992).
Few papers have proposed an analysis of the frict ions of side-contract ing beyond the
exogenous t ransact ion costs modeled µa la Tirole (1992). These contribut ions can be clas-
siØed into two main categories: Ørst , those introducing some ad hoc frict ions but making
them dependent on the environment ; second, those giving some deeper foundat ions to
these frict ions. In the Ørst class of models, Kofman and Lawarr∂ee (1996) analyze a sit -
uat ion where a supervisor can be corrupt ible or not depending on his preferences. In a
polit ical economy model of regulat ion, LaÆont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11) show that
the optimal response to regulatory capture calls for a greater reduct ion in the power of reg-
ulatory incentives as the t ransact ion costs of side-contract ing between interest groups and
the regulator are lower. Implicit ly, the frict ions of side-cont ract ing depend on the ability
of the group to organize it self and avoid the free-riding problem for collect ive intervent ion
in the polit ical arena. St ill in a regulatory framework, LaÆont and Mart imort (1999)
show that split t ing information between two non-cooperat ing regulators makes collusion
with the regulated Ørm harder. Collusion between a given regulator who is part ially in-
formed and the Ørm is now harder than with a single fully informed regulator since there
is asymmetric informat ion in side-cont ract ing. In a model with reciprocal supervision,
LaÆont and Meleu (1997) argue that reciprocal favors are easier than asymmetric deals
and that a norm of reciprocity is easier to enforce than a norm of asymmetric collusion
in an organizat ion.2 Last ly, Mart imort and Verdier (2000) build a Schumpeterian growth
model showing that colluding agents are willing to divert resources away from productive
act ivit ies in order to improve collusive technologies when they have better prospects of
remaining in a dominant Ørm. Frict ions there depend on the init ial stock of resources
available.
Contribut ions providing foundations for the transact ion costs of side-cont ract ing are
even scarcer. Mart imort (1997, 1999) and Mart imort and Verdier (2002) derive condi-
t ions that make a collusive agreement self-enforceable. The dead-weight loss of collusion
depends on the respect ive discount rates of the principal and the agents and on the infor-
mat ion st ructure.3 In Faure-Grimaud, LaÆont and Mart imort (2001), we focus on a stat ic
principal-supervisor-agent with soft informat ion where coalit ion format ion is subject to
2 In part icular, they show that asymmetric supervision may be opt imal because it eliminates possible
reciprocal favors.
3 In a somewhat diÆerent vein, Felli (1997) shows how the self-enforceability of a cont ract can be used
by the principal to bet ter Øght collusion.
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frict ions arising from the existence of asymmetric informat ion between the supervisor and
the supervisee. The principal can actually play on these frict ions to limit the e± ciency of
side-cont ract ing and to improve the Ørm's proØtability. In Faure-Grimaud, LaÆont and
Mart imort (2000), we study a model of delegat ion where the principal lets the supervisor
direct ly cont ract with the agent . In such a model, collusion is by deØnit ion no longer
an issue since there is no grand-cont ract ruling the whole organizat ion but instead a se-
quence of vert ical relat ionships. Nevertheless, the top principal designs the contract of
the intermediate supervisor to make him internalize his own object ives. The cost of doing
this depends again on the supervisor's risk aversion. Beyond modeling diÆerences4, this
lat ter paper does not study the impact of informat ion accuracy nor how the design of
organizat ions aÆect the frict ions of collusion.5 In Faure-Grimaud, LaÆont and Mart imort
(1999), we apply the same framework than in the previous paper and study a model of
delegated audit ing where the probability of audit is chosen endogenously. We show there
that the equilibrium probability of audit goes down when the auditor to whom that task
is delegated is more risk averse. Finally, Faure-Grimaud and Mart imort (2001) study a
situat ion where an intermediary between the principal and the productive agent is always
needed to allow the principal to have access to the agent . Because he does not want to
bear any risk, this uninformed intermediary may solve the incent ive problem vis µa vis the
agent in a way that the principal Ønds sub-opt imal. This result s in some agency costs of
intermediat ion, unless the intermediary is risk neut ral.
Sect ion 2 presents our model. Sect ion 3 derives the opt imal cont ract in the case where
there is no collusion between the supervisor and the agent . Risk aversion plays no role
in this non-cooperat ive implementat ion. In Sect ion 4, the opt imal collusion-proof grand-
cont ract is derived as well as some comparat ive stat ics. This sect ion highlights the role
of the supervisor's risk aversion in the design of incentives. Sect ion 5 presents some com-
parat ive stat ics and links the e± ciency of collusion to various parameters of the economic
environment. Sect ion 6 derives some result s about the design of organizat ions under the
threat of collusion. Sect ion 7 concludes. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 T h e M od el
2.1 P layer s and In form at ion
We consider a two-t ier model of a Ørm in which productive and supervisory tasks are
split . A principal, for instance the Ørm's owner, contracts with a productive agent and a
supervisor. The separat ion between ownership, product ion and supervision is mot ivated
by physical constraints. The principal himself is unable to produce or supervise either
because the act ivit ies of the Ørm are large in size or because those tasks require some
speciØc skills.
4 In Faure-Grimaud, LaÆont and Mart imort (2000), the supervisor's informat ion is soft , t he opt imal
cent ralized mechanism is not considered and the t iming of cont ract ing is diÆerent .
5Our main concern there was to ident ify two modelings of collusion and to derive from this ident iØca-
t ion closed-form formula for the t ransact ion costs of side-cont ract ing.
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The agent produces a quant ity q of output at a constant marginal cost µ. µ is a piece
of private informat ion known only to the agent . It is drawn from a discrete dist ribut ion
on £ = f µ1; µ2g (we denote ¢ µ = µ2 ° µ1 > 0) with respect ive probabilit ies ∫ and 1 ° ∫ .
The supervisor receives a signal æon the agent 's marginal cost . This signal æcan
take either of two possible values. We denote by T = f æ1; æ2g the set of possible signals.
Condit ionally on the fact that the agent is e± cient , i.e., µ = µ1, the supervisor observes
æ1 with probability ≤. Otherwise, the supervisor observes æ2. Hence, one can think of æ1
as a piece of revealing evidence on the fact that the agent has type µ1. Instead, æ2 is a
non-revealing signal (but st ill conveying some informat ion).
The signal is part ially veriØable in the sense of Green and LaÆont (1986). Only æ1 can
be manipulated by the agents who can pretend that æ2 has instead been realized. The
signal æ2 cannot be manipulated at all. One can also think of æas a hard informat ion
signal which can be hidden (the agents can pretend that a non-revealing signal has been
received when it is a revealing one). For instance, supervisory informat ion can be obtained
by disclosing documents on the agent 's performance.6 These pieces of information can be
easily hidden if they are revealing; it can be much harder and even impossible to report
convincing evidence when there is none.7
The joint probabilit ies pi j on the pairs (µi ; æj ) are deØned respect ively as p11 = ∫ ≤,
p12 = ∫ (1° ≤), p21 = 0, p22 = 1° ∫ . The supervisor' s signal is not observed by the principal,
otherwise a supervisor would not be needed. However, this signal is also learned by the
agent . Nature reveals to the agent both his type and the supervisor's information; only
the lat ter is available to the supervisor while the principal observes none of these.8
2.2 P refer en ces.
The supervisor is risk averse and has a CARA ut ility funct ion9 V = v(s) = 1r (1 ° e° r s);
where s is the wage he receives from the principal.10 The supervisor has no productive
role and is only used by the principal to bridge the informat ional gap with the agent .
The agent is inØnitely risk averse below zero wealth and risk neut ral above. For
6See Bull and Watson (2000) for such a model of evidence disclosure.
7The case of supervisory signals which are soft informat ion is analyzed in Baliga (1999) and Faure-
Grimaud, LaÆont and Mart imort (2001). In this lat ter paper, we show that the possibility of complet e
manipulat ion of this informat ion makes it useless in the case where collusion between the supervisor and
the agent takes place under symmet ric informat ion. Inst ead, collusion under asymmetric informat ion
restores some of the screening ability for the principal at least when the supervisor is risk averse.
8This nest ed informat ion st ructure is standard in both the lit erature on collusion and the related
literature on delegat ion in hierarchies (see respect ively Tirole (1986, 1992), McAfee and McMillan (1995)
and Faure-Grimaud, LaÆont and Mart imort (2000) among others).
9Holmst rom and Milgrom (1990) and Itoh (1993) develop models of collusion between two risk averse
agents in a pure moral hazard context . P rendergast and Topel (1996) analyze a model of favorit ism in a
pure moral hazard context with agents and their supervisor having all CARA ut ility funct ions. Relaxing
the CARA assumpt ion in our model could be done at the cost of some added complexity without giving
many new insight s.
10 r = 0 corresponds to the limit ing case where the supervisor is risk neut ral, v(s) = s.
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posit ive payoÆs, his ut ility funct ion can thus be writ ten as U = t ° µq where t is the
monetary t ransfer he receives from the principal. The agent produces as long as he gets
his reservat ion ut ility which is normalized to zero.11
Product ion of q units of output yields an increasing and concave revenue funct ion R(q)
to the principal (R0(¢) > 0 and R00(¢) ∑ 0). To ensure posit ive production levels and avoid
corner solut ions, we assume that the Inada condit ions are sat isØed, i.e., R0(0) = + 1 and
R0(+ 1 ) = 0 with R(0) = 0. The principal's proØt writes as: ¶ = R(q) ° s ° t:
2.3 C ont r act s
≤G r and -C ont r act s: The organizat ion is ruled by the principal through a grand-contract
GC. From the Revelat ion Principle,12 as long as the agent and the supervisor do not
collude, there is no loss of generality in rest rict ing the principal to oÆer t ruthful direct
revelat ion mechanisms of the kind GC = f t(ma; ms); s(ma; ms); q(ma; ms)g. ma is the
agent 's report to the principal. This report belongs to £ £ T . ms is the supervisor's
report to the principal which lies instead in T . To make notat ions simpler, we denote
thereafter t i j k (resp. si j k and qi j k) the agent 's t ransfer (resp. the supervisor's t ransfer and
the agent 's output) when the agent reports (µi ; æj ) and the supervisor reports æk instead,
for (i ; j ; k) in f 1; 2g3. When the agent 's and the supervisor' s reports on æcoincide, we
denote by t i j (resp. si j and qi j ) this t ransfer (resp. the supervisor's t ransfer and the
agent 's output). We also denote by ui j = t i j ° µi qi j the agent 's ex post informat ion rent
when his type is µi and both the supervisor and the agent report æj .
The informat ion st ructure limits somewhat the possible manipulat ions of the agent 's
and the supervisor's reports. Indeed, the agent necessarily reports a type µ1 when he
reports also that the supervisor's signal is æ1. Otherwise, the reports would be incon-
sistent given the common knowledge information st ructure. Moreover, only æ1 can be
manipulated and both the supervisor and the agent can then pretend that æ2 has instead
been realized. Again, the reverse is impossible. We denote by ¡ j the set of reports on µi
compatible with æj . From the discussion above, we have thus ¡ 1 = f µ1g and ¡ 2 = f µ1; µ2g.
≤ C ollu sive Side-C ont r act s: The side-contract between the supervisor and the agent
consist s of Ørst , a secret side-transfer ø paid by the agent to the informed supervisor
when æ= æ1 and second, a coordinat ion of the supervisor's and the agent 's individual
reports (ma; ms) in this state of nature to the principal. Given that the knowledge of æ1
perfect ly reveals the agent 's type to the supervisor, collusion takes place under complete
informat ion. For simplicity, the supervisor has all the bargaining power at the side-
cont ract ing stage and makes a take-it -or-leave-it oÆer to the agent . The colluding partners
11Our result s obtain for any ut ility funct ion for the agent as long as we maint ain this assumpt ion of
inØnite risk aversion below zero wealth. This assumpt ion is made for t ract ability as, in the absence of
collusion, it leads to a simple t rade-oÆbetween e± ciency and rent ext ract ion. A similar but more complex
t rade-oÆwould also arise with a posit ive risk aversion and ex ante cont ract ing as we model here (for pure
adverse select ion models based on the t rade-oÆbetween incent ives to reveal and insurance see Salani∂e
(1990) and LaÆont and Rochet (1999) in the case of a cont inuum of st ates).
12The Revelat ion P rinciple holds in the case of signals which are part ially veriØable as in this paper
(see Green and LaÆont (1986)).
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are able to commit to this side-cont ract .
Finally, it is worth st ressing that side-contract ing suÆers a priori from no exogenous
frict ions. The collect ive gains from a joint manipulat ion of reports can be fully exploited
by the collusive partners. One unit of bribe taken from the agent is thus fully pocketed
by the supervisor.
2.4 T im ing
The t iming for the game of contractual oÆer cum coalit ion format ion is as follows:
≤ The principal oÆers a grand-cont ract to both the supervisor and the agent .
≤ The supervisor and the agent both simultaneously accept or refuse this grand-contract
at the ex ante stage, i.e., being st ill uninformed on the agent 's type and the supervisory
signal. If either of them refuses, the game ends.
≤ The agent learns his product ivity parameter µ and the supervisor's signal æ. The
supervisor learns only æ.
≤ When æ1 realizes, the supervisor makes a take-it -or-leave-it oÆer of a collusive side-
cont ract to the agent . If the lat ter refuses, the grand-cont ract is played non-cooperat ively.
If he accepts, the colluding partners commit to a joint manipulat ion of their reports to
the principal and to a bribe.
≤ Reports are made, product ion takes place and t ransfers within the grand-contract and
(possibly) within the side-cont ract , are paid.
Note that the acceptance of the grand-cont ract by both the supervisor and the agent
takes place before the learning of any informat ion. Hence, the supervisor's and the agent 's
ex ante part icipat ion const raints must be sat isØed by this grand-cont ract . Because of our
assumpt ion of inØnite risk aversion below zero wealth for the agent , the lat ter's ex ante
part icipat ion constraint amounts to a set of ex post part icipat ion const raints, one in each
state of nature.13 With this t iming, the principal has the maximal ability to commit by
designing the contours of the organizat ion before any learning of informat ion. This seems
to be the most relevant assumpt ion in the context of the theory of the Ørm.
3 B ench m ar ks
3.1 C ost less Sup ervision
Let us Ørst consider the case where the principal direct ly receives the signal æon the
agent 's private informat ion. This can be viewed as a stylized model of a small Ørm in
13Had the agent been risk neut ral, ex ante cont ract ing would allow the principal to ext ract all the
agent 's rent . In such a model, the t ransfers given to the agent can nevertheless st ructured to leave no
incent ives to lie and can dest roy the scope for collusion with the supervisor.
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which the supervisory task can be performed by the principal himself. Alternat ively, if we
st ick to the interpretat ion of our model as a picture of a large Ørm in which supervision
is needed, everything happens as if the supervisor would cost lessly reveal t ruthfully his
informat ion to the principal before the lat ter contracts with the agent .
When the principal learns æ1, he can infer for sure the value of the agent ' s type and
there is no longer any informat ional gap between him and the agent .
When instead æ2 has been observed, the principal is st ill uninformed on the agent 's
type. As it is standard in two-type adverse select ion models, the following const raints are
of part icular importance:14
≤ The incent ive compat ibility const raint of an e± cient agent when the principal has
observed æ2:
u12 ∏ u22 + ¢ µq22; (1)
≤The ex ante part icipat ion constraint of the inØnitely risk averse agent can be decomposed
into two relevant ex post part icipat ion const raints:
u22 ∏ 0; (2)
when the principal has observed æ2, and
u11 ∏ 0 (3)
when the principal has instead observed æ1.
Accordingly, the opt imal contract solves:
max
f qi j ;u i j g
X
( i ;j )
pi j (R(qi j ) ° µi qi j ° ui j )
subject to (1)-(2) and (3).
Solving this problem yields the conditional optimum deØned as:
R0(qd1 ) = R0(qd1j ) = µ1 for j in f 1; 2g (4)
R0(qd22) = µ2 +
∫ (1 ° ≤)
1 ° ∫
¢ µ: (5)
To reduce the cost of the incent ive compat ibility const raint (1) and make it less at t ract ive
for an e± cient agent to mimic an ine± cient one, the principal reduces the output produced
by an ine± cient agent . The e± cient agent 's output remains equal to it s Ørst best value. A
posit ive rent is left to the e± cient agent (ud12 = ¢ µqd22) only when the principal gets a non-
revealing supervisory signal. The part icipat ion const raints (2) and (3) are both binding.
Finally, as the supervisory informat ion becomes less informat ive, i.e., as ≤ decreases to
zero, the output distort ion characterized in (5) increases.
14When the following const raints are binding, as it will be the case at the opt imum of the principal's
problem, it is easy to show that the remaining incent ive and part icipat ion const raints are st rict ly sat isØed.
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3.2 T he C ollu sion -Free Out com e
Let us now envision the case where the agent and the supervisor do not collude. They
report their information non-cooperat ively to the principal who is uninformed of the
realizat ion of æ. We then look for a truthful Bayesian-Nash equilibrium between the
agents.
≤ When (µi ; æj ) has been learned by the agent , the agent 's incentive compat ibility con-
st raint is:
ui j ∏ t i 0j 0j ° µi qi 0j 0j ; for all µi 0 in ¡ j 0 and j 0∏ j : (6)
≤ When æj has been learned by the supervisor, the supervisor's incent ive compat ibility
const raint is:15 X
i
pi j v(si j ) ∏
X
i
pi j v(si j j 0) for all j 0∏ j : (7)
Here, we can use the logic of Nash implementat ion.16 The signal æis a piece of informat ion
which is commonly known by the agent and the supervisor. Hence, it can be cost lessly
ext racted by the principal by set t ing si j 0j = t i j 0j = ° qi j 0j = ° 1 when the agent 's and
supervisor's respect ive reports on æ diÆer, i.e., when j 6= j 0. In this case, (6) can be
reduced to the only relevant incent ive constraint (1). Similarly, (7) is necessarily sat isØed
since its right -hand sides for j > j 0 are then inØnitely negative.
Finally, the supervisor's ex ante part icipat ion const raint writes as:
X
( i ;j )
pi j v(si j ) ∏ 0: (8)
The candidate for the opt imal cont ract ing outcome with a non-cooperat ive behavior be-
tween the supervisor and the agent is thus the condit ionally opt imal outcome described
in Sect ion 3.1. By always giving to the supervisor a zero wage si j = 0 for all (i ; j ), the
principal eliminates the risk borne by the supervisor and sat isØes his ex ante part icipat ion
const raint (8).
If the principal can perfect ly cont rol and forbid communicat ion between the agent and
the supervisor, he can achieve the same outcome as with direct supervision. Important ly,
this result is independent of the supervisor's degree of risk aversion when the agents do
not collude.
In the analysis of this sect ion, we did not insist on unique Nash implementat ion. It is
however easy to ensure uniqueness by oÆering an arbit rarily small posit ive payoÆto the
supervisor if he reports the revealing signal.
15We mult iply this const raint by
P
i pi j > 0 to express the const raint as a funct ion of ex ante probabil-
it ies rather than as a funct ion of condit ional probabilit ies. Note that this incent ive const raint is Bayesian
only when æ= æ2 . When æ= æ1 , the agent 's type is perfect ly known by the supervisor.
16See Maskin (1999).
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4 C ollu sive B eh avior
The non-cooperat ive implementat ion of the collusion-free outcome above is somewhat un-
realist ic since it is not immune to a collect ive manipulat ion of the agent 's and supervisor's
reports on æ. Indeed, the supervisor can be bribed by the µ1 agent when æ1 has been
observed so that they both claim that æ2 has instead realized. By doing so, the supervisor
and the agent can share the rent ¢ µqd22 which goes to the µ1 agent when the principal
receives a non-revealing signal. Henceforth, we consider the case where the supervisor
and the agent collude against the principal through a binding side-contract when æ= æ1
has been observed.
4.1 C ollusion -P roofn ess C onst r a int s
Following Tirole (1986) and LaÆont and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11), the Collusion-Proofness
Principle applies in this environment. There is no loss of generality in rest rict ing the prin-
cipal to oÆer collusion-proof grand-cont racts. For such a cont ract , the best side-contract
consist s of no side-t ransfer and no collect ive manipulat ion of the reports made by both the
supervisor and the agent when æ= æ1. This last requirement means that the colluding
partners must maximize their collect ive surplus by report ing that µ1 has realized when æ1
has been observed. To be collusion-proof, a grand-cont ract must thus sat isfy the following
coalition incentive compatibili ty const raints:
s11 + u11 ∏ s12 + u12 (9)
and
s11 + u11 ∏ s22 + u22 + ¢ µq22: (10)
The right -hand sides above correspond to what the coalit ion can get by manipulat ing the
agent 's and the supervisor's common report on æ1 and claiming that instead æ2 has been
realized, and that µ = µ1 (equat ion (9)) or that µ = µ2 (equat ion (10)). In this last case,
the coalit ion manipulates the agent 's report on his type µ1 and we get two possible values
for these right -hand sides.
Note that (1) will st ill be binding at the opt imal collusion-proof grand-cont ract because
there is no need to give some extra rent to an e± cient agent when the supervisor reports
t ruthfully having observed no revealing signal. When this lat ter const raint is binding,
the more st ringent constraint between (9) and (10) is that obtained for the highest of the
two wages s12 and s22. The principal cannot dist inguish between these two transfers since
the coalit ion can always pretend to be in the state of nature with the highest supervisory
wage. Hence, the principal loses much ∞exibility in the supervisor's wage and we must
necessarily have:
s12 = s22 = s2 (11)
where s2 is a constant wage received by the supervisor whenever he claims to have observed
a non-revealing signal æ2.
The relevant coalit ion incent ive compat ibility const raint thus writes as:
s11 + u11 ∏ s2 + u22 + ¢ µq22: (12)
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Using this simpliØcation in the expression of the supervisor's wages, we can also rewrite
the supervisor's ex ante part icipat ion const raint as:
∫ ≤v(s11) + (1 ° ∫ ≤)v(s2) ∏ 0: (13)
4.2 C har act er izing t h e Opt im al C ollusion -P r oof C ont r act
The principal maximizes the Ørm's expected proØt subject to coalit ion incent ive, individ-
ual incentive and part icipat ion constraints. The optimal grand-contract thus solves thus
the following problem (denoted thereafter by (P )):
max
f qi j ;u i j ;s11 ;s2g
X
( i ;j )
pi j (R(qi j ) ° µi qi j ° si j ° ui j )
subject to constraints (1)-(2)-(3)-(12) and (13).
P r op osit ion 1 The optimal collusion-proof grand-contract entails:
≤ Constraints (1)-(2)-(3)-(12) and (13) are all binding. All other omitted constraints are
strictly satisØed.
≤ A decreasing schedule of outputs with no distortion for the most e± cient agent
qc11(r ) = qc12(r ) = qd1
and a downward distortion for the ine± cient agent qc22(r ) (qc22(r ) < qd22) which is implicitly
deØned by:
R0(qc22(r )) = µ2 +
∫
1 ° ∫
¢ µ
√
1 °
≤e° r ¢ µq
c
22(r )
1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r ¢ µqc22 (r )
!
: (14)
≤ The supervisor's wages in the diÆerent states of nature are respectively given by:
sc11 = ¢ µqc22(r ) +
1
r
ln
≥
1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r ¢ µqc22(r )
¥
> 0; (15)
sc2 =
1
r
ln
≥
1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r ¢ µqc22(r )
¥
< 0: (16)
To bet ter understand the distort ion of the collusion-proof cont ract , let us Ørst start by
describing what happens when the supervisor is risk neutral, i.e., r = 0. In this case,
we can have some supervisory wages such that the coalit ion incent ive const raint (12)
and the supervisor's part icipat ion const raint (13) are both sat isØed and the principal
implements the condit ionally optimal outcome cost lessly. To do so, we Ønd the wages
that make those two const raints binding. We observe that sc11 is equal to a strict ly
posit ive reward (1 ° ∫ ≤)¢ µqc22; while sc2 is instead negat ive (° ∫ ≤¢ µqc22).17 From (14), we
17Note in fact that the wages deØned by (15) and (16) converge towards these values as r goes to zero.
However, in the limit ing case r = 0, other pairs of wages sat isfy the coalit ion incent ive compat ibility
const raint and are such that the part icipat ion const raint is binding. Another set of such wages can be
obtained by making the supervisor residual claimant for the hierarchy's proØt . A scheme s(q) = R(q) ° T
where T is a Øxed-fee designed to ext ract all t he supervisor's rent can also do the job.
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also obtain that if r = 0 the opt imal outputs are those obtained in the absence of collusion:
qc22(r = 0) = qd22: Together, this means that collusion has no bite if the supervisor is risk
neut ral. The intuit ion is simple. When the supervisor reports that the agent is e± cient ,
the principal must increase the wage he pays him above his wage for the non-revealing
report . Indeed, this wage diÆerent ial must exceed the maximal bribe ¢ µqd22 that the agent
is willing to pay. Imposing this risk on the supervisor is not cost ly for the principal as
long as the supervisor is risk neut ral. Therefore, there is no need to alter the output
levels compared to the collusion-free outcome. Not ice however that the collusion threat
prevents the principal from giving the supervisor the same wage in all states of nature.
The reader will have recognized an argument often made in pure moral hazard con-
texts. The choice of whether to hide or not a revealing signal can actually be viewed as
a binary moral hazard decision made by the supervisor. It is well-known from the moral
hazard literature18 as well as from the adverse select ion literature with ex ante contract -
ing19 that , under risk neut rality, the principal can achieve the same outcome as in the
case where the moral hazard variable could be direct ly cont racted upon by the principal.
To achieve this outcome, the principal can simply make the supervisor residual claimant
for the Ørm's proØt by selling him the Ørm for an ex ante Øxed-fee.
With risk aversion, implement ing group incent ives becomes cost ly for the principal.
Risky monetary t ransfers with the same expected values are worth less for the risk averse
supervisor than for the principal. A risk averse supervisor accepts the wage lot tery pro-
posed by the principal only if he receives a risk premium. Now, the principal faces a real
t rade-oÆbetween preventing collusion and giving insurance to the supervisor. The total
risk borne by the supervisor depends on the product ion plan since, to deter collusion, the
supervisor's wage diÆerent ial needs to exceed the collusive stake which is worth ¢ µqc22.
The greater the output qc22, the more risky should the wage lot tery faced by the supervisor
be. As a result , allocat ive distort ions now become valuable for the principal. Distort ing
the output level downwards reduces the risk borne by the supervisor and also the con∞ict
between coalit ion incentive compat ibility and part icipat ion const raints.
It is also worth comment ing on the form taken by the opt imal collusion-proof cont ract .
Everything happens as if the principal relies on a sequent ial implementat ion of the second
best outcome which seems to be in line with some of the real-world pract ices observed
within the Ørm. First , the principal calls for a report on æmade by the supervisor only.
Condit ional on the fact that this report is non-revealing, the principal then asks the agent
for a report on his type µi . If the supervisor's report is instead revealing, the principal
ext racts all the agent 's informat ion rent since his type is known to be µ1 for sure. A
process of sequential reports within the organizat ion is thus weakly optimal in face of the
threat of collusion.20
18See Holmst rom (1979), Shavell (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983) among others.
19See Salani∂e (1990) and LaÆont and Rochet (1999).
20Of course, in pract ice and as most result s in mechanism design, the mechanism above requires st rong
commitment from the principal. Once the collusive partners have commit ted themselves not to collude
after a collusion-proof cont ract has been accepted, the principal has an incent ive to renegot iate with the
supervisor and give him more insurance. This con∞ict between renegot iat ion and collusion is analyzed in
Felli and Villas-Boas (2000).
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5 C om p ar at ive St at ics
This sect ion discusses how the opt imal response of the organizat ion changes with the main
parameters of the model.
5.1 T he R ole of R isk Aver sion
We have emphasized that without risk aversion, the coalit ional incentive problem can be
t rivially solved. We now fully characterize how risk aversion aÆects the opt imal product ion
plan, the wage schedule and the principal's welfare.
P r op osit ion 2 The impact of supervisor's risk aversion is the following:
≤ qc22(r ) is a decreasing function of r with qc22(0) = qd22. When r goes to inØnity, qc22(r )
converges towards qu22 deØned by:
R0(qu22) = µ2 +
∫
1 ° ∫
¢ µ: (17)
≤ When r goes to zero, the supervisor's wages s11, (resp. s2), converge to (1 ° ∫ ≤)¢ µqd22,(resp. ° ∫ ≤¢ µqd22). When r goes to inØnity, the supervisor's wages s11, (resp. s2), converge
to ¢ µqu22, (resp. 0).
≤ The principal's welfare monotonically decreases with r .
The negat ive impact of r on the ability to use a supervisor is clear.21 Prevent ing collusion
requires making the supervisor' s wage risky. The cost of doing so is the risk premium
that must be given to the supervisor. This cost is increasing in r .
Further intuit ion can be gained in case of a small uncertainty on cost parameters
and thus on collusive stakes (e.g. supposing that ¢ µ is small enough). Using Taylor
expansions, we Ønd that :22
sc2 = ° ∫ ≤¢ µqc22(r ) +
r
2
(1 ° ∫ ≤)∫ ≤¢ µ2(qc22(r ))2: (18)
The Ørst term on the right -hand side of (18) represents the supervisor's negat ive wage
received in the case of risk neut rality when the agent is ine± cient and the supervisor has
reported nothing to the principal. The second term on this right-hand side is actually
the risk premium that the principal must pay to the risk averse supervisor to induce his
part icipat ion. As sc2 is paid with probability 1 ° ∫ ≤ and sc11 is paid with probability ∫ ≤,23
21See also Tirole (1986, P roposit ion 4) and the discussion in Faure-Grimaud, LaÆont and Mart imort
(2001).
22 It is worth st ressing that the Taylor expansions below also hold when the agent 's ut ility funct ion is
not CARA. The value of r to be used is then the degree of risk aversion at zero wealth.
23Since uc12 = uc22 = 0, (12) yields indeed:
sc11 = s
c
2 + ¢ µqc22 (r ):
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the overall ext ra agency cost due to risk aversion, i.e., the expected extra wage paid to
the supervisor with respect to what he receives in the absence of collusion, then becomes:
∫ ≤sc11 + (1 ° ∫ ≤)sc2 =
r
2
∫ ≤(1 ° ∫ ≤)¢ µ2(qc22(r ))2: (19)
The right-hand side of (19) is precisely the cost of deterring collusion. It is just equal
to the risk premium that must be added to the supervisor' s expected wage to make him
accept the risky lot tery of wages necessary to induce collusion-proofness. We already
know from the literature on decision-making under uncertainty that , when the so-called
Arrow-Prat t approximation holds,24 the risk-premium increases as the square of the size
of the risk.
In our context , this property highlights the non-linearity of the cost of deterring col-
lusion (for small collusive stakes) whenever r > 0. The expected wage to be paid to the
supervisor increases and is convex in the collusive stake ¢ µq22: Intuit ively, this means that
collusion is at the margin less cost ly as collusive stakes are lower. The result ing output
distort ions can be deØned by:
R0(q22(r )) = µ2 + ∫1 ° ∫ ¢ µ(1 ° ≤) + r
∫ ≤
1 ° ∫
(1 ° ∫ ≤)¢ µ2q22(r ): (20)
It follows from the previous observat ions that Ørms prefer to hire less risk averse
supervisors and this preference is more pronounced when collusive stakes are higher.
Typically, this is the case when the uncertainty about the agent , as measured by ¢ µ; is
larger.
5.2 T he Accuracy of Sup ervisory In form at ion
Taking risk aversion as given, we now invest igate the impact of improving the precision
of the supervisory signal. This improvement can be obtained by innovat ions in moni-
toring technologies or simply by using external sources of information. In this respect ,
the performances of Ørms in related environments subject to correlated shocks provide
useful signals to improve control within the hierarchy. Market interact ions thus provide
informat ion which aÆects the cost of inside collusion within the Ørm.
To get an idea of the trade-oÆinvolved when information is improved, it is useful to
use the Taylor expansion (19). Indeed, this formula holds not only for opt imal outputs but
also for any other output q22 as long as ¢ µ is small enough. For a Øxed output , we observe
that improving the precision of the supervisory informat ion, a priori has an ambiguous
impact on the cost of collusion. This cost is proport ional to the variance of æand it has
an inverted U-shape because increasing continuously ≤Ørst makes the uncertainty borne
by the risk averse supervisor increase and then decrease as long as ∫ > 12 .
25 On the
beneØt side, improving supervisory information helps the principal to reduce the agent ' s
informat ion rent .
24See Gollier (2001, p. 22)
25For ≤ large enough and if ∫ > 12 , there is no t rade-oÆfrom the principal's point of view: an increase
in ≤ also reduces the expected risk to which the supervisor is sub ject and thus his expected wage.
14 Contributions to Theoretical Economics Vol. 2 [2002], No. 1, Article 5
http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol2/iss1/art5
P r op osit ion 3 The impact of the accuracy of the supervisory information is the follow-
ing:
≤ When ≤ increases towards 1 (perfectly informative signal), the ine± cient agent's
output qc22(r ) increases towards the output qa2 deØned as:
R0(qa2 ) = µ2 +
∫
1 ° ∫
¢ µ
√
1 °
e° r ¢ µq
a
2
1 ° ∫ + ∫ e° r ¢ µqa2
!
: (21)
≤ The principal's welfare is increasing in ≤.
Notice that an increase in the informat ion accuracy cannot hurt the principal: he could
always induce the supervisor to report an informat ive signal with probability less than
one, result ing in an outcome equivalent to what is obtained at lower accuracy levels.
Mathemat ically, the impact of the accuracy of information on the principal's welfare
can be best seen by looking at the impact of a change of ≤ on the constrained set and on
the principal' s object ive funct ion (see Figure 1 below).
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F igu r e 1: Opt imizat ion in the (s2; s11) plan.
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First , note that an increase in ≤ leaves unchanged the coalit ion incentive compat ibility
const raint . Note also that , for u11 = u22 = 0, this const raint deØnes a straight line which
cuts the north-west quadrant of the (s2; s11) space. At the same t ime, the set of wages
(s2; s11) that can be accepted by the risk averse supervisor lies above a convex curve which
turns clockwise around the origin as ≤ increases. Therefore, an increase in the accuracy
of informat ion result s in a smaller const rained set . If the principal's expected welfare
was kept the same, this would result in a higher expected cost of prevent ing collusion
with both s11 and s2 being raised. The principal relies more on rewards and less on
punishments as the supervisory informat ion becomes more precise. However, at the same
t ime, the principal's object ive funct ion changes with ≤ and the increase in the expected
payment to the supervisor that result s from the modiØcat ion of the constrained set must
be compared with the ext ra saving made from giving less often an informat ion rent to the
agent .
This comparison is rather st raight forward. Intuit ively, the expected reduct ion of the
agent 's information rent always exceeds the possible increase in the supervisor's wage
cost . Indeed, the supervisor, when he can prove that the agent is e± cient , is paid less
than what the agent gets in the absence of supervision. Remember that , to sat isfy the
coalit ion incentive compat ibility const raint , the supervisor must get a reward when he
reports an informat ive signal and a penalty otherwise and that such a risky lot tery must
be accepted by the supervisor because he does not know the agent ' s type at the t ime
of joining the Ørm. The possibility of using a penalty to induce informat ion revelat ion
makes it cheaper for the principal to obtain informat ion from the supervisor than from
the inØnitely risk averse agent who cannot be punished. The advantage of the supervisor
as a source of informat ion comes from his bet ter risk bearing at t ributes.
This gain of using the supervisor is the driving force behind the Collusion-Proofness
Principle in this context . If using the supervisor is less cost ly than paying the agent
direct ly, it pays to use the former and give him a collusion-proof wage rather than relying
solely on the agent 's report and giving the lat ter an informat ion rent .
Notice also that , as supervisory information becomes more precise, the second-best
output converges towards the output obtained in a simple principal-agent hierarchy with
ex ante cont ract ing and an agent having the same ut ility funct ion as the supervisor.26 In
fact , as the supervisor gets almost perfect informat ion on the agent , this coalit ion behaves
almost as a single agent having a degree of risk aversion which is the minimum between
that of the supervisor and that of the agent , i.e., r . Had the principal direct ly cont racted
with the agent , the second-best distort ion would instead be obtained by replacing the
right -hand side of (21) by the usual virtual cost πµ + ∫1° ∫ ¢ µ which is greater. Again, this
points to the superiority of cont ract ing with a supervisor even if he shares all relevant
informat ion with the agent .
Instead, in the neighborhood of ≤= 0, the supervisor becomes useless for the principal.
The three t ier hierarchy reduces to a standard principal-agent pair.
When collusion takes place under complete informat ion, the principal always gains
from improving the technology of monitoring. Let us instead suppose that the supervisor
26See LaÆont and Mart imort (2002, Sect ion 2.11.2) for the derivat ion of a similar result .
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only gets an imperfect signal on the agent 's type and is always unsure about the lat ter's
cost parameter. Collusion between the supervisor and the agent then takes place under
asymmetric information and some frict ions in side-cont ract ing arise from this. This is
the set t ing we have analyzed in Faure-Grimaud, LaÆont and Mart imort (2001) where,
assuming that the supervisor's signal is soft informat ion, we show that the principal may
also play on the degree of asymmetric information between the supervisor and the agent
to increase those frict ions and Øght collusion more easily. To do so, he chooses a signal
with an interior precision.
We conclude this sect ion with the remark that Ørms prefer hiring supervisors who
are bet ter able to observe the agent 's cost . This preference is more pronounced when
collusive stakes and the degree of risk aversion of these supervisors are higher. This
suggests a subst itutability between supervisory accuracy and risk aversion. A more risk
averse supervisor can be preferred to a less risk averse one if the former has a more precise
signal. It also leads to the predict ion that Ørms evolving in a more risky environment
are willing to pay more for accurate supervisory information than Ørms evolving in stable
environments.
6 C ollu sion C ost s an d Or gan izat ional D esign
In this sect ion, we derive from the previous trade-oÆbetween insurance and incent ives
some insights on the design of organizat ions. Admit tedly this sect ion is more exploratory,
but our modest goal here is only to show that in a mult i-agent context , designing the
organizat ion to ease collusion deterrence is a complementary tool to bet ter provision of
individual incent ives.
6.1 T he P ossib le Ir r elevance of Sup ervisory St ruct u r es
The design of supervisory st ructures for mult i-agent Ørms entails choosing the span of
cont rol for a given supervisor on supervised agents. We now give a simple example
in which the supervisory st ructure is actually irrelevant . This example thus oÆers a
benchmark with respect to which one can assess how changes in the informat ion st ructure
may create economies or diseconomies of scope in supervision.
Suppose that the Ørm is involved in producing two lines of products which are techno-
logically unrelated. There exists no interact ion between the product lines either in terms
of their demands or their costs. Each of the two diÆerent agents produces a diÆerent
product and the cost parameters of those agents are independent ly dist ributed. If one
supervisor is chosen for each line of product , the Ørm can be viewed as twice the replica
of the one-product -line Ørm that we have analyzed so far. In this case, supervisors get
signals on the product lines they respect ively control which are again independent ly dis-
t ributed. The principal's revenue is the sum of the revenues obtained on each product
separately.
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If a single supervisor is chosen to cont rol both products, he will receive a wage si j + skl
with probability pi j pkl when informat ion on product line 1 is f µi ; æj g and informat ion
on product line 2 is f µk ; ælg.27 The supervisor's ex ante part icipat ion const raint in this
mult i-task environment is thus:
X
( i ;j ;k;l )
pi j pklv(si j + skl ) ∏ 0: (22)
In this context , we consider the collusive side-contracts between the common supervisor
and each productive agent that are only bilateral. Coalit ion incent ive const raints then
take the same form as previously and we obtain:
P r op osit ion 4 Having one supervisor per product line or only a single supervisor for
both product lines yields the same proØt to the principal.
Assuming CARA preferences is key for this irrelevance result . With a CARA ut ility func-
t ion, adding independent risks has no eÆect on the supervisor's degree of risk aversion
which remains constant . Indeed, when the supervisor is already subject to a Ørst risky
wage lot tery needed to prevent collusion with the agent producing good 1, preventing
further collusion with the agent producing good 2 is no more cost ly than if the supervisor
were not cont rolling the Ørst act ivity at all. This would no longer be true with ut ility
funct ions exhibit ing wealth eÆects.28 More generally, in this framework with risk aversion,
the general theory of organizing supervisory structures would closely look like and com-
plement the theory of organizing productive tasks which was developed by Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1990) in a pure moral hazard context .
6.2 C ollusion and C om p et it ion
So far, we have modeled the Ørm as being insulated from any market interact ion. An
obvious issue is to invest igate how the cost of collusion relates to the compet it ive pressure
on the Ørm. A Ørst channel is the following: the performances of compet ing Ørms in
the market place may provide secondary sources of informat ion to the principal by a
simple yardst ick compet it ion argument . Such sources of informat ion are subst itutes to the
supervisory information from the principal's point of view. However, market informat ion
is cheaper because the principal does not need to reward the supervisor to get it .
Even when yardst ick mechanisms cannot be used, maybe because all information ob-
tained from competitors is contained in the market price and this price is a nonveriØable
variable, compet it ion has an impact on the way collusion can be fought . Compet it ion
aÆects the size of the Ørm's output and thus the collusive stakes that the supervisor can
27 In full generality, the supervisor's wage should be writ t en as si j k l . With CARA ut ility funct ions, it
can be shown that there is no loss of generality in making the addit ive assumpt ion.
28The risky wage lot tery needed to prevent collusion on product line 1 then has a cert ainty equivalent
which may shift the supervisor's degree of risk aversion and aÆect the cost of prevent ing collusion on
product line 2.
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manipulate. On the other hand, Øght ing collusion is part of the cost borne by the Ørm
and this aÆects it s ability to react to the compet it ive pressure.
To see this interact ion between compet it ion and collusion in more detail, consider the
following simple model. Suppose that there are n symmetric Ørms in a market , compet ing
in quant ity. The demand is supposed to be linear P (Q) = A ° Q where Q = nP
s= 1
qs: The
number of compet ing Ørms n can be viewed as measuring the degree of compet it ion on
this market .
The internal st ructure of all these Ørms is the same as the canonical organizat ion
presented before. Moreover, the costs of all Ørms are perfect ly correlated so that , even if
there are n Ørms in the market place, there are only two states of nature: one where all
Ørms have a low cost , or where they all have a high cost .29
To simplify the exposit ion, we concent rate on the case of a small uncertainty on cost
(¢ µ small enough). Adapt ing (20) to the situat ion, we get that the equilibrium output
of a given Ørm when costs are high sat isØes:
a ° (n + 1)qc22 = µ2 +
∫
1 ° ∫
¢ µ(1 ° ≤) + r ∫ ≤
1 ° ∫
(1 ° ∫ ≤)¢ µ2qc22
or
qc22 =
a ° µ2 ° ∫1° ∫ ¢ µ(1 ° ≤)
r ∫ ≤1° ∫ (1 ° ∫ ≤)¢ µ2 + (n + 1)
:
From the above, we get that the elast icity of output with respect to n is given by:
¥ = ° n@q
c
22
qc22@n
=
n
r ∫ ≤1° ∫ (1 ° ∫ ≤)¢ µ2 + n + 1
< 1:
The elast icity of the Ørm's output with respect to n measures the impact of an increase
in the compet it ive pressure on the Ørm's output . Of course, as the Ørm is facing more
compet itors in the market place, it s own output decreases but , at the margin, it decreases
less as there are more competitors. We also observe that the elast icity ¥ also decreases
with r . The equilibrium output is thus less responsive to an increase in compet it ion as r
is large.
In fact , an increase in r plays the same role as an increase in the number of compet-
ing Ørms in determining the equilibrium output of a given Ørm. With more compet ing
Ørms, the marginal incent ives to expand output decreases because the residual demand
faced by a given Ørm diminishes. With less frict ions in internal collusion, those marginal
incent ives are also lower because the cost of collusion is at the margin higher for large
scale product ion. The degree of risk aversion of the supervisor thus plays the same role
as an increase in compet it ive pressure. As a result , the Ørm's equilibrium output reacts
less to variat ions in this pressure as r increases.
29This assumpt ion makes the analysis simpler without changing the result s. The result s also holds when
costs are independent ly dist ributed. Of course, t o just ify that yardst ick mechanisms are not used in this
environment with correlated informat ion we need to assume that a given principal cannot communicate
with agents in other compet ing hierarchies or, as we argued above, that the price which may contain the
relevant informat ion for comparison is nonveriØable.
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P r op osit ion 5 An increase in the supervisor's risk aversion reduces the sensitivity of the
Ørm's output to competitive pressure.
6.3 C ollusion and Ver t ical Int egrat ion
Consider the owner of a buying unit (the principal), who contracts for the provision of a
good with a selling unit (the agent). The principal can use a \ supervisor", i.e., a member
of his own organizat ion to get a signal about the external agent 's productivity. We make
two assumpt ions:
A1: Collusion can only take place inside organizat ions.
This is an ext reme assumpt ion but several considerat ions can mot ivate the view that
collusion between agents in diÆerent Ørms is much more di± cult than inside the same
Ørm. The t ransfer of bribes between agents in separate Ørms can be easier to detect than
inside the same Ørm. The role of the supervisor as key provider of information may also be
reduced in a market relat ionship as the informat ion can now come from several unrelated
sources. Besides, knowing who to bribe can be more of a problem. Also, the provider of
informat ion in a market environment may be bet ter able to diversify risk by dealing with
several agents. Important ly, the enforceability of collusion is likely to be easier within
the same organizat ion. Again, our model is a stat ic one where we assume at the outset
that colluding part ies can enforce their side-cont racts. The usual just iØcat ion, made
formal in Tirole (1992) or Mart imort (1999), is to appeal to a repeated game argument .
But along these lines, colluding partners in separate Ørms are less likely to interact in
the future so that enforcing colluding agreement is probably more di± cult when agents
belong to diÆerent organizat ions. All the above arguments lead us to assume that vert ical
integrat ion eases collusion.
A2: Vert ical integrat ion improves informat ion accuracy.
This assumpt ion is often made in the vert ical integrat ion literature. For instance,
Arrow (1975) has argued that one consequence of vert ical integrat ion is to improve infor-
mat ion ∞ows between the integrated units. This assumption can in part icular be just iØed
when repeated relat ionships between the supervisor and the agent improve the lat ter' s
monitoring.
These two features can easily be captured in our framework. Denote by ≤S the accuracy
of supervisory informat ion under separat ion. Taking the collusion cost in (20) to be zero,
the opt imal output under separat ion sat isØes:
R0(qS22(r )) = µ2 +
∫
1 ° ∫
¢ µ
≥
1 ° ≤S
¥
: (23)
Let us instead suppose that vert ical integrat ion takes place. Using again (20), we Ønd
that for small ¢ µ, the optimal output under integrat ion is given by:
R0(qI22(r )) = µ2 +
∫
1 ° ∫
¢ µ(1 ° ≤I ) + r I ∫ ≤
I
1 ° ∫
(1 ° ∫ ≤I )¢ µ2qI22(r ): (24)
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This formula shows that , as r I becomes small enough, the added cost of collusion
within the integrated Ørm is lower than the ext ra beneØt from bet ter information.
P r op osit ion 6 Vertical integration dominates separation when the supervisor is not too
risk averse.
The trade-oÆis simple: integrat ion facilitates collusion but potent ially improves infor-
mat ion accuracy. Integrat ion is best when the cost of get t ing this addit ional information
is not too high, i.e. when collusion is not too di± cult to deter. This happens in organi-
zat ions with supervisors who are not too risk averse. Hence, under our assumptions, we
would predict that Ørms with relat ively risk tolerant supervisory structures, characterized
by the use of informat ion sensit ive incent ive schemes, will be the ones willing to take over
other Ørms to vert ically integrate.
6.4 C ollusion and U ncer t aint y
The nonlinearity of the collusion costs also has consequences for the behavior of Ørms
under uncertainty. We now invest igate how uncertainty in the environment where the Ørm
evolves interacts with the scope for collusion between agents. To model uncertainty in the
environment, let us suppose that the principal's revenue is now subject to a mult iplicat ive
random shock Ø so that ØR(q) goes to the principal. To Øx ideas, let us also suppose that
Ø can take only two values Ø and πØ with prob(Ø= Ø) = Æ.
Several interpretat ions can Øt this modeling. For instance, Ø can capture some ∞uc-
tuat ions in the proØtability of the Ørm's demand: a low Ø would correspond to a bust , a
high Ø to a boom. One would then compare collusion in Ørms subject to a lot of cycli-
cal variat ions with what happens in Ørms in more stable condit ions or, for instance, in
more mature indust ries where the state of demand is highly predictable. In a regulatory
environment, Ø may capture some polit ical ∞uctuat ions as diÆerent part ies in power (the
principals) may have diÆerent preferences about how large the product ion of the regulated
Ørm should be.
Under uncertainty, the principal commits to a grand-cont ract st ipulat ing which pro-
duct ion should be made as a funct ion of the supervisor and the agent ' s reports but also as
a funct ion of the realized shock Ø that we assume to be veriØable. Agents decide whether
or not to accept the cont ract before the realizat ion of Ø. Thus, the t iming is ident ical to
the one proposed in Sect ion 2.4 for the Ørst 4 steps. Ex ante contract ing will refer to the
case where reports are made at step 5, Ø is realized at step 6. Ex post cont ract ing refers
to the reversed sequence for the last two steps.
Important ly, the scope for collusion depends Ønely on the t iming of communicat ion
between the principal and his agents. If reports are made before Ø is known, agents are
forced to collude under uncertainty on the realizat ion of Ø. In this case, the risk-averse
supervisor asks for a bribe which is the average collusive stake over the diÆerent possible
realizat ions of Ø, i.e., EØ(¢ µq22(Ø)) = ¢ µ(Æq22(Ø) + (1 ° Æ)q22( πØ)).
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Using again our approximation (19) valid for small ¢ µ, the part icipat ion constraint of
a supervisor engaged in such an ex ante collusion is:
EØ(∫ ≤s11(Ø) + (1 ° ∫ ≤)s2(Ø)) = r2 ∫ ≤(1 ° ∫ ≤)(¢ µEØ(q22(Ø)))
2: (25)
Instead, if reports are made after Ø is known, agents collude ex post . In this case, the
risk-averse supervisor asks for a bribe which is the collusive stake in the realized state of
nature. The supervisor's part icipat ion constraint becomes:
EØ(∫ ≤s11(Ø) + (1 ° ∫ ≤)s2(Ø)) = r2 ∫ ≤(1 ° ∫ ≤)EØ((¢ µq22(Ø))
2): (26)
Clearly, ensuring the part icipat ion of the risk averse supervisor under ex ante collusion
is less cost ly than with ex post collusion because of the convexity of the risk premium with
respect to collusive stakes. This intuit ion can be made formal as shown in the Appendix
and we have:
P r op osit ion 7 In an uncertain environment, the principal prefers to solicit reports of
the Ørm's employees before the realization of uncertainty. This results in outputs levels
which ∞uctuate more than one would obtain with communication taking place after the
resolution of uncertainty.
Forcing reports before the realizat ion of the external shock allows the principal to oÆer
wages to the supervisor which are not contingent on that shock. This independence can
be seen as an informativeness principle for collusion: the shock on demand is unrelated
to the supervisory informat ion and thus, should not be part of an opt imal cont ract for
the supervisor. Indeed, oÆering wages contingent on it s realizat ion would only subject
the supervisor to addit ional risk without improving the supervisor's incent ives to report
the truth. Thus, the principal is bet ter oÆinsuring the supervisor against this risk.
The principal thus prefers st rict ly to induce communicat ion before the realizat ion of
Ø. Of course, the choice of this t iming is completely irrelevant when collusion is not an
issue. In addit ion to output distort ions and individual incent ive schemes, a new tool is
now used by the principal to curb coalit ional behavior: the t iming of communicat ion.
The principal's preference for ex ante report ing also has implicat ions for the opt imal
product ion plans. In the case of small ¢ µ; we can derive the opt imal outputs for each
realizat ion of Ø under ex ante collusion:
ØR0(q22(Ø)) = µ2 + ∫1 ° ∫ ¢ µ(1 ° ≤+ r≤(1 ° ∫ ≤)¢ µEØ(q22(Ø))) : (27)
The output distort ions for diÆerent values of Ø are linked together by the fact that the
relevant collusive stake depends now on the average production level. This implies that
product ion plans in diÆerent states of the world (i.e. diÆerent values of Ø) are linked. If
for instance Ø < πØ, q22(Ø) < EØ(q22(Ø)) and the downward distort ion needed in state Ø
is ampliØed compared to what would happen with ex post collusion. The organizat ion
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implements incent ive schemes which are more sensit ive to shock realizat ion. If one in-
terprets the sensit ivity of output as a measure of the Ørm's ∞exibility to adapt to, or to
ant icipate shocks, we see that the opt imal degree of ∞exibility is aÆected by the threat of
collusion.
7 C on clu sion
This paper has proposed an analysis of collusive situat ions when there is a t rade-oÆ
between insurance and incentives not to collude. Doing so has enabled us to discuss the
frict ions of collusive agreements and to link those frict ions to some parameters of the
external environment where the Ørm evolves. Our Ønal sect ion has shown that this trade-
oÆhas some implicat ions for the design of organizat ions and some of them were explored
here.
It should also be clear that the object ive of linking t ransact ion costs of collusion
within the organizat ion to the external environment of the Ørm is a research program
with a larger scope than this simple paper. Any theory of frict ions in side-cont ract ing is
likely to oÆer in one way or the other some relat ionships between what happens inside
the Ørm and in it s external environment . Instead of being based on the trade-oÆbetween
risk and incent ives considered here, alternat ive theories of those frict ions could build on
asymmetric informat ion, repeated self-enforceable relat ionships, imperfect cultural t rans-
missions, or non-monetary exchanges between colluding partners. But opening the black
box of the frict ions of collusion seems key to making progress on the understanding of
this phenomenon and should give rise to interest ing future research.
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A p p en d ix
P r oof of P r op osit ion 1:
≤ First note that (2) must be binding to reduce the cost of (1). Moreover, to reduce the
right -hand side of (12), (1) must be binding.
≤ Hence, we can rewrite (12) as:
s11 + u11 ∏ s2 + ¢ µq22: (28)
Taking Ørst outputs as given, the principal's problem becomes:
M ax f u11 ;s11 ;s2g∫ ≤(R(q11) ° µ1q11 ° u11 ° s11) + ∫ (1 ° ≤)(R(q12) ° µ1q12 ° s2 ° ¢ µq22)
+ (1 ° ∫ )(R(q22) ° µ2q22 ° s2)
subject to (3)-(28) and (13).
We denote by Æ, ∏and π the respect ive mult ipliers of these const raints.
≤ Optimizing with respect to u11; s11 and s2 yields respect ively:
° ∫ ≤+ Æ+ ∏= 0; (29)
° ∫ ≤+ ∏+ π∫ ≤v0(s11) = 0; (30)
° (1 ° ∫ ≤) ° ∏+ π(1 ° ∫ ≤)v0(s2) = 0: (31)
Summing (30) and (31) yields:
π
≥
∫ ≤e° r s11 + (1 ° ∫ ≤)e° r s2
¥
= 1: (32)
Note Ørst that , (32) implies that π> 0 and thus (13) is binding. Using that v(¢) is CARA,
we obtain from (13) that ∫ ≤e° r s11 + (1 ° ∫ ≤)e° r s2 = 1 and thus π = 1.
Mult iplying (30) by 1 ° ∫ ≤ and (30) by (31) by ∫ ≤ and subt ract ing the second from
the Ørst equat ion, we Ønd that : ∏= ∫ ≤(1 ° ∫ ≤)(v0(s2) ° v0(s11)).
Using (29) and (30) we get Æ= ∫ ≤v0(s11) > 0 and thus
u11 = 0: (33)
Hence, we need s2 < s11 to sat isfy the coalit ion incent ive const raint (28) and ∏ > 0.
Finally, ∏> 0 implies that (28) is binding and thus:
s11 = s2 + ¢ µq22: (34)
Insert ing this lat ter condit ion into (13) yields (16). (34) yields (15).
≤ Optimizing with respect to outputs yields (14).
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P r oof of P r op osit ion 2: Immediate derivat ion of (14) yields:
0
B@R00(qc22(r )) °
r ¢ µ2∫ ≤(1 ° ∫ ≤)er ¢ µqc22 (r )
(1 ° ∫ )
≥
(1 ° ∫ ≤)er ¢ µqc22(r ) + ∫ ≤
¥2
1
CA
dqc22
dr (r ) =
∫ ¢ µ2≤(1 ° ∫ ≤)qc22(r )er ¢ µq
c
22(r )
(1 ° ∫ )
≥
(1 ° ∫ ≤)er ¢ µqc22 (r ) + ∫ ≤
¥2 :
(35)
Hence dq
c
22
dr (r ) < 0.
The limits of the supervisor's wages when r goes to zero have already been derived in
the text . When r goes to inØnity, the limits are obtained direct ly from (16) and (15).
The impact on the principal' s welfare is computed from:
EW = ∫ ≤(R(qc11) ° µ1qc11 ° sc11) + ∫ (1 ° ≤)(R(qc12) ° µ1qc12 ° sc2 ° ¢ µqc22)
+ (1 ° ∫ )(R(qc22) ° µ2qc22 ° sc2)
which is a funct ion of r .
Using the Envelop Theorem, we Ønd:
@EW
@r = °
√
∫ ≤
@sc11
@r + (1 ° ∫ ≤)
@sc2
@r )
!
where @s
c
11
@r ;
@sc2
@r denote the part ial derivat ives of the wages w.r.t . r holding qc22 constant .
We obtain that :
@EW
@r =
1
r
√
sc2 +
∫ ≤¢ µqc22e° r ¢ µq
c
22
1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r ¢ µqc22
!
To study the sign of this last expression deØne f (x) as f (x) ¥ ∫ ≤xe° x1° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° x + ln(1 ° ∫ ≤+
∫ ≤e° x ): In fact , @E W@r < 0 if and only if for any x > 0, f (x) < 0: We immediately verify
that f (0) = 0 and that f 0(x) = ° ∫ ≤xe° x (1° ∫ ≤)(1° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° x )2 < 0; so the result .
P r oof of P r op osit ion 3: The derivat ion of qa22 is immediate from (21) with ≤ going to
one. The principal's welfare is increasing in ≤ as (making use of the Envelop Theorem):
@EW
@≤ = °
@sc2
@≤ =
∫
r
1 ° e° r ¢ µqc22
1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r ¢ µqc22
> 0
It is also immediate to observe that @E W@≤ is increasing in r or ¢ µqc22:
P r oof of P r op osit ion 4: The proof follows similar lines to those of Proposit ion 1. We
use symmetry between product lines to simplify notat ions below.
Note that the supervisor's ex ante part icipat ion const raint writes thus as:
(∫ ≤)2v(2s11) + 2∫ ≤(1 ° ∫ ≤)v(s11 + s2) + (1 ° ∫ ≤)2v(2s2) ∏ 0 (36)
since the supervisor may have observed either two revealing signals, only one, or none.
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Maximizing the principal's expected proØt with the standard agent 's individual in-
cent ive (1) and part icipat ion (2) and (3) constraints, the coalit ional incent ive const raint
(12) and the supervisor's part icipat ion const raint (36), and Ørst taking again outputs as
given, the principal's problem becomes:
M ax f u11 ;s11 ;s2g(∫ ≤)2(2R(q11) ° 2µ1q11 ° 2u11 ° 2s11)
+ 2∫ 2≤(1 ° ≤)(R(q11) + R(q12) ° µ1(q12 + q11) ° s2 ° s11 ° ¢ µq22)
+ (∫ (1 ° ≤))2(2R(q22) ° 2µ2q22 ° 2s2)
subject to (3)-(28) and (36).
Again, we denote by Æ, ∏and π the respect ive mult ipliers of these const raints.
Optimizing with respect to the supervisor's wages and summing the corresponding
Ørst order condit ions, we get:
π
≥
∫ ≤e° r s11 + (1 ° ∫ ≤)e° r s2
¥2
= 1: (37)
Using that v(¢) is CARA, we obtain also from (36) that
≥
∫ ≤e° r s11 + (1 ° ∫ ≤)e° r s2
¥2
= 1: (38)
Thus π = 1. From the fact that (28) and (36) are binding, we obtain the same values for
s11 and s2 than in the case of Proposit ion 1.
P r oof of P r op osit ion 7:
A Ørst possibility for the principal is to oÆer cont racts after the realizat ion of Ø (ex
post contract ing): For each Ø, the principal then solves a program ident ical to the one
solved to obtain Proposit ion 1, except for the fact that R(q) is replaced by ØR(q): The
principal's welfare is thus:
EW ex post = EØ[∫ ≤(ØR(q11(Ø) ° µ1q11(Ø)) + ∫ (1 ° ≤)(ØR(q12(Ø)) ° µ1q12(Ø) ° ¢ µq22(Ø))
+ (1 ° ∫ )(ØR(q22(Ø) ° µ2q22(Ø)) ° s2(Ø)] (39)
where s2(Ø) = 1r ln
≥
1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r ¢ µqc22 (Ø)
¥
; and with the optimal outputs being equal to
their Ørst best levels for a low cost agent and deØned by:
ØR0(qc22(Ø)) = µ2 +
∫
1 ° ∫
¢ µ
√
1 °
≤e° r ¢ µq
c
22 (Ø)
1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r ¢ µqc22(Ø)
!
; (40)
otherwise. Not ice that ensuring s11(Ø) ∏ s2(Ø) + ¢ µq22(Ø) to deter collusion result s in
∞uctuat ions of s11(Ø) and s2(Ø) as the output levels ∞uctuate according to (40). The
supervisor is thus subject to an addit ional risk with ex post contract ing.
Otherwise the principal can force the agent and the supervisor to report their private
informat ion before the realizat ion of Ø: The principal's program is similar to the previous
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one except for the fact that collusive stakes are diÆerent . In this case, collusion is deterred
if and only if:
EØ(s11(Ø) + u11(Ø)) ∏ EØ(s22(Ø) + u22(Ø)) + ¢ µEØ (q22(Ø)) :
With ex ante cont ract ing, the supervisor's part icipat ion const raint becomes:
EØ(∫ ≤v(s11(Ø)) + (1 ° ∫ ≤)v(s2(Ø))) ∏ 0:
It should be clear that u11(Ø) = u22(Ø) = 0 at the opt imum. Moreover, the supervisor' s
part icipat ion const raint is less cost ly if he receives a constant wage independent of Ø and
this does not change the coalit ion incentive const raint . Denote by sA2 and sA11 these wages.
Suppose that the principal decided to implement the levels of output deØned in
(40) as part of the opt imal ex ante cont ract (of course, the opt imal output levels ex
ante are not those deØned in (40)). Then the principal welfare would be equal to the
same expression as in (39) except that Æs2(Ø) + (1 ° Æ)s2( πØ) would then be replaced by
sA2 =
1
r ln
≥
1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r ¢ µ(Æq22 (Ø)+ (1° Æ)q22( πØ))
¥
: The convexity of 1r ln (1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r x ) in
x implies that Æs2(Ø) + (1 ° Æ)s2( πØ) > sA2 : Hence, ex ante cont ract ing with the same
output levels gives to the principal a higher welfare than with ex post cont ract ing.
Then the principal opt imizes also w.r.t . outputs and that results in the Ørst best levels
for a low cost agent and in outputs sat isfying:
ØR0(qA22(Ø)) = µ2 +
∫
1 ° ∫
¢ µ
√
1 °
≤e° r ¢ µq
m
22
1 ° ∫ ≤+ ∫ ≤e° r ¢ µqm22
!
where qm22 = Æq22(Ø) + (1 ° Æ)q22( πØ) for a high cost agent .
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